A phishing campaign tracked as Operation CloudFire used ordinary-looking Google Calendar invitations to steal active Google account sessions, even when victims used multi-factor authentication (MFA). The campaign shows why a familiar sender, a Google-branded page, or an MFA prompt is not always proof that a sign-in request is safe.
Calendar invites became phishing lures
Material Security reported that the campaign had been active since at least mid-August 2026. It sent invitations for fake voicemail notices, payment requests, court summonses, RFPs, and other routine business messages. Some invitations came from accounts the attackers had already compromised, which made the senders look familiar to recipients.
The links often passed through Google services before sending victims to the phishing site. That detail helped the messages appear trustworthy to automated security systems and to people who checked only the visible domain. Material Security later reported taking down 897 domains connected to the operation, although it warned that the underlying framework could be rebuilt. (Material Security’s Operation CloudFire report)
Live proxies defeated normal MFA
The attack used a reverse proxy, which is a server that sits between a victim and a real website. Instead of showing a simple fake login page, the proxy displayed a live copy of Google’s sign-in process. It passed the victim’s username, password, and MFA response to Google in real time.
According to the campaign report, the proxy relayed SMS codes, authenticator codes, Google’s Tap-Yes number matching, and phone-based account recovery as they arrived. The attacker then captured the live session after the victim completed the sign-in. A live session can provide access to services such as Gmail and Drive without requiring the password and MFA step again. (BleepingComputer’s campaign report)
Warning signs remain useful
Because the invitation can arrive through a legitimate calendar system, calendar phishing may look like a normal work request. Warning signs include an unexpected event, urgent language, a request to review payment or account information, and a link that asks you to sign in again.
Do not use the contact details or links inside an unexpected invitation. Instead, verify the request through a separate channel you already trust. For example, contact the person through a known phone number or open the organization’s website using a saved bookmark or an address you enter yourself.
Google’s Calendar help page explains how to report suspicious invitations as spam. Google also says that the report feature applies to events sent from Google Calendar and that reporting removes the event from the calendar.
Account checks limit damage
If you entered credentials into a suspicious page, treat the account as potentially exposed. Open Google’s official compromised-account guidance directly rather than following links from the invitation. Google recommends reviewing recent account activity, checking signed-in devices, examining recovery information, and securing the account.
- Open the Google Account security page directly from a trusted browser bookmark or by typing the address yourself.
- Review recent security activity and remove devices or sessions you do not recognize.
- Change the Google Account password and any other password that was reused elsewhere.
- Check Gmail forwarding rules, filters, delegates, and connected applications for changes you did not make.
- Notify your employer or school security team if the account is managed by an organization.
Google’s account security guidance says users should review unfamiliar sign-in notifications and use Security Checkup to review security settings and activity. MFA remains important because it blocks many attacks, but session theft means it should be combined with careful verification of unexpected sign-in requests and calendar messages.
Trusted tools need scrutiny
Operation CloudFire reflects a broader shift toward attacks that abuse trusted services instead of relying only on obviously fraudulent domains. Calendar systems, cloud storage, meeting platforms, and collaboration tools can all become delivery channels because people expect them to generate automated messages.
Material Security reported that the campaign appeared to have dispersed and looked finished, but said rebuilding the infrastructure was inexpensive. The lesson extends beyond Google Calendar: treat unexpected activity inside a familiar application with the same caution as an unfamiliar email.
References
Google. (n.d.). Protect your account if there's unfamiliar activity. Google Account Help. https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/7305876?hl=en
Google. (n.d.). Report inappropriate calendar invitations and events. Google Calendar Help. https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/13155911?hl=en-tw
Google. (n.d.). Secure a hacked or compromised Google Account. Google Account Help. https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/6294825?hl=en
Material Security. (2026, October 28). 897 domains later: How Operation CloudFire burned the calendar invite campaign. https://material.security/resources/897-domains-later-how-operation-cloudfire-burned-the-calendar-invite-campaign
Material Security. (2026, November 4). Google Calendar phishing campaign hijacks sessions, bypasses MFA. BleepingComputer. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/google-calendar-phishing-campaign-hijacks-sessions-bypasses-mfa/
Material Security. (2026, September). Reputation says it's fine: How calendar invites and a live MFA proxy steal Google sessions. https://content.material.security/hubfs/Material%20Security%20Site%20CMS/CalendarInviteWhitepaper-sep2026.pdf
