A supply-chain attack turned trusted website code into a malware delivery route on November 16, 2026. Researchers found malicious JavaScript being served through Optimizely Web Experimentation, a service used to test and personalize websites. The code appeared on sites connected to at least 178 organizations and targeted payment cards, cryptocurrency activity, browser data, and some Apple devices.
178 Websites Served Poisoned Code
Security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI said the malicious code appeared in 188 Optimizely snippets linked to 178 organizations. The list included sites associated with Zoom, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, the BBC, Air France-KLM, Ledger, and Peacock. The full findings are documented in Report URI's investigation.
This was a supply-chain attack. Instead of breaking into each website separately, criminals compromised a service those websites used. The altered script came from Optimizely's legitimate content delivery network, so a visitor's browser could treat it as trusted code. The incident shows why third-party analytics, advertising, testing, and customer-experience scripts can create risks beyond a company's own servers.
Optimizely Closed the Entry Point
Optimizely said an unauthorized party exploited a weakness in the Web Experimentation account signup flow and used it to impersonate users. The attacker then inserted JavaScript into some customer projects. Optimizely's November 17 incident report says the first malicious code was written at 07:51 UTC on November 16. The company detected the activity at 13:34 UTC, fixed the vulnerability at 16:10 UTC, and removed injected code from affected projects by 22:24 UTC.
Optimizely said the incident affected Web Experimentation only. It reported no evidence that customer passwords were exposed and said its other listed products, including Feature Experimentation and its software development kits, were not affected. The company also said the injected script targeted card details entered directly into website forms and cryptocurrency transfers. Card details entered into hosted payment frames, such as those operated by Stripe or Adyen, were not accessible to the script.
Visitors Faced Several Risks
The injected code created several risks. According to Report URI and Reuters, it attempted to replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses, capture card details entered into forms, steal cookies and screenshots, and load additional code aimed at iPhones and iPads. A wallet-address swap can redirect a cryptocurrency payment to an attacker even when the user believes the destination is correct.
These risks did not mean every visitor to every named website was compromised. Reuters reported that it could not determine whether the code succeeded on each site or how many devices and accounts were affected. Optimizely said not every customer was targeted, and some companies reported disabling the service or finding no evidence of compromise. Apple told Reuters that the underlying iOS vulnerabilities used by the attackers had already been fixed and that devices running current software were protected.
Protect Browsing and Payments
People who visited an affected website during the November 16 exposure window should take unexpected payment activity, cryptocurrency transfers, account alerts, or unusual login notifications seriously. Review financial and cryptocurrency transactions, avoid approving unfamiliar wallet addresses, and contact the relevant bank, card provider, or exchange through its official app or website if something looks wrong. Do not use a phone number or link from a suspicious message.
Keeping phones, browsers, and computers updated remains important because modern browser attacks often depend on flaws that vendors have already fixed. Apple maintains a security releases page listing current security updates. Users should also be cautious when a website suddenly asks for a wallet confirmation, payment details, a browser extension, or a downloaded file.
The incident also matters to website operators. Optimizely recommends that customers review site activity, payment and cryptocurrency transactions, browser requests, and Content Security Policy reports for the exposure window. Developers should inventory third-party scripts and consider protections such as Content Security Policy and Subresource Integrity. The MDN supply-chain security guidance explains that Subresource Integrity lets a browser reject an externally hosted script when its contents have changed.
The wider lesson is simple: a familiar domain and a valid security certificate do not prove that every script delivered from that domain is safe. Third-party code should be treated as part of a site's security boundary, not as harmless background software.
References
Apple. (2026). Apple security releases. Apple Support. https://support.apple.com/en-us/100100
Helme, S. (2026, November 16). World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely. Report URI. https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/
MDN contributors. (2026, July 8). Supply chain attacks. MDN Web Docs. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/Supply_chain_attacks
Optimizely. (2026, November 17). Security incident initial report for customers: Optimizely Web Experimentation. https://pages.optimizely.com/rs/947-RKE-048/images/Security%20Incident%20Report%20-%20Optimizely%20Web%20Experimentation%20-%20Nov%2017%202026.pdf
Reuters. (2026, November 16). Popular websites compromised in bid to steal crypto, target iPhone users. Investing.com. https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/popular-websites-subverted-in-bid-to-steal-crypto-target-iphone-users-5031640
